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Abstract: The pragmatism of political parties is one of the causes for the 
proliferation of political dynasties and the massive number of single candidates 
in several electoral politics periods at the local level. The implementation of the 
2020 local election simultaneously gave birth to many candidates who have a 
kinship with political officials both at the central and regional levels, both 
currently or who have served. Apart from the practice of dynastic politics, a 
single candidate's presence also adds to the problems in the democratic process 
at the local level. A single candidate is present as a consequence of implementing 
the local election system simultaneously, which opens wide the opportunity for 
the local election to be held even though only one pair of regional head 
candidates are joined, as a consequence, the empty column is presented as the 
opponent of the match. This article collects data through a literature study. To 
answer these two phenomena, the author examines them during the local 
election implementation. This study indicates that these two phenomena co-opt 
local democracy and clog the circulation of the leadership elite. Both political 
dynasty candidates and single candidates have enormous potential to win 
elections. Both phenomena are caused by poor internal recruitment and 
candidate selection processes. 
 
Abstrak: Pragmatisme partai politik menjadi salah satu penyebab menjamurnya 
dinasti politik dan masifnya jumlah calon tunggal dalam beberapa periode politik 
elektoral di tingkat lokal. Penyelenggaraan Pilkada serentak 2020 melahirkan 
banyak calon yang memiliki kekerabatan dengan pejabat politik baik di tingkat 
pusat maupun daerah, baik yang saat ini maupun yang pernah menjabat. Selain 
praktik politik dinasti, kehadiran calon tunggal juga menambah persoalan dalam 
proses demokrasi di tingkat lokal. Hadirnya calon tunggal sebagai konsekuensi 
dari pelaksanaan sistem pemilihan kepala daerah secara serentak, yang membuka 
kesempatan seluas-luasnya bagi terselenggaranya pemilihan kepala daerah 
meskipun hanya diikuti oleh satu pasangan calon kepala daerah, akibatnya kolom 
kosong tersebut dihadirkan sebagai lawan pertandingan. Artikel ini 
mengumpulkan data melalui studi literatur. Untuk menjawab dua fenomena 
tersebut, penulis mengkajinya pada saat pelaksanaan pilkada. Studi ini 
menunjukkan bahwa dua fenomena ini mengkooptasi demokrasi lokal dan 
menyumbat sirkulasi elit kepemimpinan. Baik calon dinasti politik maupun calon 
tunggal memiliki potensi yang sangat besar untuk memenangkan pemilu. Kedua 
fenomena tersebut disebabkan oleh proses rekrutmen dan seleksi kandidat 
internal yang buruk 
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INTRODUCTION  
The study of local politics has always attracted many circles, especially after 1998. Local 
election and decentralization became mass production of various local political phenomena. 
One of the phenomena that have attracted attention is political dynasties. Political scientists use 
various terms to explain the phenomenon of more than one family member in political office, 
including political dynasties, dynastic politics, kinship politics, political clans, and political 
families. 
The definition of different terms is inseparable from the carefulness of scientists to 
provide limitations about this phenomenon. There is debate among scientists to categorize 
whether this includes a manifestation of political dynasties or not? Are all family members who 
take part in political office immediately generalized as a manifestation of a political dynasty or 
not? These debates are described by (Purwaningsih & Subekti, 2017) by dividing 3 (three) 
dimensions: The time dimension (the previous political family had at least two periods of 
power); The number dimension (2 or more people); The position dimension (the same or 
different political positions). 
The description above provides some limitations regarding the proper use of the term 
political dynasty. However, it has not been able to answer whether all family members, 
including those with political achievements, can be categorized as political dynasties? This 
generalization discredited family members who were related by blood to the previous ruler. 
However, on the other hand, almost every region throughout Indonesia, where many political 
positions are occupied by those who are related by blood. So that the circulation of power elites 
in the regions become clogged. 
The absence of strict regulations to regulate nominations in electoral politics at both the 
executive and legislative levels is the source of the spread of political dynasties. Although the 
government through Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and 
Mayors, especially Article 7 letter r, which prohibits regional heads (incumbents) from running 
for regional heads. Candidates for governor, regent and mayor may not have marital ties, 
lineages upward, downward, and sideways unless there is at least one term of office 
(Purwaningsih & Subekti, 2017). However, on July 8, 2015, the Constitutional Court revoked the 
ban because it was considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution Article 28J paragraph 2 
concerning every citizen's political rights to vote and be elected in general elections. This 
problem becomes a dilemma increasingly; on the other hand, the network of family power that 
controls an area is getting stronger, but on the other hand, if this is prohibited, it will circumcise 
citizens' political rights that the constitution has regulated. 
This political dilemma in a theoretical review is described by (Purwaningsih & Subekti, 









Chart 1. Classification of Dynastic Political Manifestations 
Source: (Purwaningsih & Subekti, 2017) 
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The chart above divided into 4 (four) quadrants can be read: quadrant I is not a political 
dynasty because it goes through a political recruitment process following procedures and has 
quality based on the qualifications needed in the political recruitment process. Meanwhile, the 
other 3 (three) quadrants are political dynasties' manifestations because they do not fulfil one 
or even the two elements. The analysis put forward by (Purwaningsih & Subekti, 2017) uses a 
political approach by concluding that the political recruitment process is the entry point for 
massive political dynasty practices. This means that political parties, as the production 
containers for political candidates, perpetuate political dynasties, both during political 
recruitment and in the process of candidate selection. 
The description above is only one of the factors behind the many factors that have been 
investigated by previous researchers regarding the massive and perpetual practice of political 
dynasties. Smith (2012)  and Querubin (2013) highlight the electoral system that incumbents 
open up to include other family members in political office. Another factor behind the formation 
of political dynasties is the poor recruitment and candidate selection process of political parties 
as studied by Fiva & Smith (2013), Geys (2017), and Purwaningsih & Subekti (2017). The 
results of the research shown by Feinstein (2010) and Buehler, 2007 show that the big name of 
the family is the main trigger for other family members also to take part and enjoy the political 
legacy of the previous ruler. 
The factors that shape and perpetuate political dynasties are more due to the ownership 
of capital, social, economic, political, cultural, and symbolic, so that non-dynastic candidates 
cannot compete. This reason was stated by Mendoza et al. (2012); Rusnaedy (2020); Rusnaedy 
& Purwaningsih (2018). The ownership of economic capital, which is operationalized, can make 
it easier when a political campaign is held. The strength of social networks and big names of 
families built by the incumbent is used as a political commodity to get as many votes as possible. 
This capital inheritance is passed down and enjoyed by relatives who make it easier to enjoy 
political office through electoral political contestation (Smith, 2012). 
In the Indonesian context, the formation of political dynasties was more due to 
decentralization and direct local election, which provided space for local elites in regions that 
previously only controlled the economic field to become local political elites. This research is 
strengthened by descriptions of local elites (Hamid, 2015). The author sees these researchers as 
referring to the research results (Sidel, 2005) about local bosses in the Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia. Hadiz (2004), although not directly addressing political dynasties, in his findings, it is 
revealed that decentralization is an anomaly of local democratic practices in Indonesia. This 
means that many problems are presented through the decentralized system and local election 
that are implemented in Indonesia, which in any case, are the most problematic. This includes 
the growing network of family political power in several regions in Indonesia. There are 108 of 
the 548 regions in Indonesia which are led by regional heads and deputy regional heads related 
to political dynasties. 
In recent periods, apart from political dynasties, a single candidate's presence has also 
become a matter of electoral politics in the regions. Both have a thick tangent. The presence of a 
single candidate has continuously increased from the 3 (three) local election periods held. In 
2015 3 regions had a single candidate from 269 regions that held local election. In 2017 there 
were nine single candidates from 101 regions who held local election contestation. In 2018 16 
regional head candidates were single candidates. In 2020, a single candidate's presence had 
increased significantly compared to the previous local election; namely, there are 25 regions. 
The phenomenon of a single candidate presenting the Empty Column as a match has 
damaged the substance of political contestation, which has eliminated healthy competition 
between candidates. The increase in a single candidate in each local election implementation is 
an anomaly because Indonesia adheres to a multi-party system. Supposedly, every party or 
coalition of political parties should bring their best cadres to advance in every election for 
political officials. So far, there are two types of single candidates: a single candidate for the 
incumbent and a single candidate for the family of the person in power. 
The problem is that the single candidate who generally is the incumbent does not always have a 
good performance. This phenomenon raises the suspicion of an agreement between a political 
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party and a single candidate. Anggraini argues that if the incumbent's performance is not good, 
the performance is not supportive, and the candidates who emerge are still single, there will be 
allegations of pragmatism and transactional politics (Jay, 2018). A single candidate is legal based 
on the regulation on regional head elections. However, this undermines democracy. Political 
competition for the best results has stalled. A single candidate who is elected later will be difficult 
to control because they support the majority of seat holders in the legislature. 
 
METHOD 
This article focuses on the analysis of single political dynasties and candidates in several 
local election implementations. The research method used in this paper is library research. The 
analysis is based on collecting secondary data based on literature collected from various 
supporting literature, scientific journals, books, research reports, and relevant research reports. 
Information sourced from the literature search results is researched and analyzed to obtain the 
latest information data from the results of data collisions from several previous secondary data 
sources. The researchers chose the literature review to complete the data information from 
previous research on political dynasties and single candidate. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Single Candidate and Political Dynasty 
The local election is not only the momentum for five years of electoral politics in the 
regions, more than that, but the local election is also the foundation of local democracy that 
supports national democracy. In O'Neill's opinion, "all politics is local", which means that 
national democracy will be healthy, stable and mature if, at the local level, its democratic values 
are first rooted. This means that democracy at the national level will be better if the 
instruments, order, and configuration of local political wisdom and politeness are established 
earlier. That is, direct local election as one of the leading indicators of local democracy is also 
the primary foundation for political democracy in Indonesia. It is the same as the opinion 
expressed by Robert Bates that national political architecture is shaped by the local political 
landscape. 
However, what is happening now is that the local democratic order has not been 
implemented very well (Nurmandi et al., 2015). Several diseases that have undermined the 
implementation of the local election have become increasingly acute since the simultaneous 
local election system was implemented. The government's good intention to carry out the local 
election simultaneously to make the budget efficient for the election is not directly proportional 
to the improvement of the quality of democracy. On the contrary, the strengthening of political 
dynasties and the proliferation of single candidates were terrible symptoms of the democratic 
process at the local level. These two phenomena co-opt the process of implementing electoral 
politics in the regions. Although these two phenomena do not have a direct causal relationship, 
they have a thick tangent at some point. 
The simultaneous local election (2015, 2017 and 2018) totalled 202 total attempts to 
form a political dynasty. Candidates have kinship relations with political officials both at the 
central and regional levels and have held positions. Although in the end, political dynasties were 
unable to control absolutely by winning political contestations. The political dynasty candidates 
won 58% and lost 42% of the total attempt. 
Table 1. Political Dynasties of Local Elections 2015-2018 
No Status Total Effort Win Lost 
1 District head 146 82 64 
2 Deputy Regional Head 56 35 21 
Total 202 117 85 
Source: Perludem, 2020 
In the 2020 local election contest, 52 regional head candidates were indicated to have a 
kinship with political officials. Of these, 71.5% of candidates will advance at the district level, 
with 27 candidates for regent and ten candidates for deputy regent. Meanwhile, 25% of 
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candidates indicated that advanced political dynasties at the city level consisted of 10 
candidates for mayor and three candidates for deputy mayor. Below are some candidates (not 
listed as all) who have a kinship with politicians at both the central and regional levels. 
Table 2. Political Dynasties of Local Election 2020 








Mayor of Solo Joko Widodo’ Son 
PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar, 
NasDem, PAN, PSI, PKB 
and PPP 





PDIP, Gerindra, PAN, 
Golkar, NasDem, Hanura, 
PSI and PPP 
3 Siti Nur Azizah 













Gerindra, PDIP, PSI, PAN 
and Hanura 











Regent of Kediri 
Pramono 
Anung’s Son 
PKB, Gerindra, PDIP, 
Golkar, NasDem, PKS, PPP, 
PAN and Demokrat 





Golkar, PAN and PKS 





PKB, PBB and PDIP 






PDIP and Golkar 
10 Lisa Mayor of Binjai  
Muhammad 
Idaham’s Wife 
PDIP, NasDem, PAN and 
Hanura 





PDIP, NasDem, Gerindra, 






Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, 
Perindo, PAN, PKS, PPP 
and PKB 




Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, 
and Perindo 






PDIP, Gerindra and 
NasDem 
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15 Debby Vita Dewi 
Deputy Regent 
of South Bangka  
Jamro’s Wife PDIP, PPP and PBB 






PDIP and Hanura 






PDIP, Hanura, Partai 
Gerindra and Perindo 





PDIP, Golkar and Nasdem 





PDIP and PAN 





PDIP, NasDem and PAN 
The presence of candidates who have a kinship with political officials is massive. At the 
central level, the president and vice president each have families that participate in the 2020 
local election contest. Several ministers also have kinship with candidates, including: Prabowo 
Subianto, Pramono Anung, Syahrul Yasin Limpo and Ida Fauziah. In the regions, the 
mobilization of family members to become candidates for regional head and deputy regional 
heads is even more massive. 
Kompas Research and Development surveyed political dynasties. The survey results 
showed that 69.1% of respondents said they would vote for regional head candidates because of 
their abilities, regardless of whether they had family ties or not with political officials. 
Meanwhile, 21.9% thought that they did not vote because they were relatives of public officials, 
7.7% said they did not know, and 1.3% said they would vote because of public officials' family. 
However, from the survey, 58% agreed that there was a prohibition or restriction for political 
officials' families to participate in the regional elections. As many as 35.7% disagreed, and 6.2% 
did not know. Furthermore, 60.8% stated that dynastic political practice is a bad thing. Only 
28.2% had a good opinion, and 11% did not know. 
This phenomenon is an anomaly in a country that adheres to a democratic system. This 
phenomenon arises because there is a reorganization of traditional forces. The revitalization of 
this traditional power occurred after decentralization in 2001 and the direct local election in 
2005. Local elite groups took advantage of these opportunities by optimizing political, social 
and family networks so that they obtained considerable public support. 
At the implementation of the 2020 local election, of the 270 regions that held, 30 regions 
were practising political dynasties or around 11%. This figure is still relatively small, but this 
figure may continue to increase every local election implementation period if improvements are 
not carried out immediately upstream to downstream. 
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Graph 1. Dynastic vs non-Dynastic 
Source: processed by researcher 
There are several types of kinship status in the 2020 local election that include family 
members in electoral political contestation. For example, President Jokowi and Vice President 
Ma'ruf Amin have son registered as candidates for the regional elections as candidates for 
mayor of Solo and South Tangerang, and Jokowi's son-in-law is running as a candidate for 
mayor of Medan. Moreover, several other political officials have other kinship relationships with 
candidates both side-to-side (wife/husband, siblings, in-laws) and downward (son and 
nephews). 
 
Graph 2. Kinship Status 
Source: The Indonesian Intitute, 2020 
Unable to resolve the political dynasty, which is a problem in the implementation of 
local election, the presence of a single candidate adds to the burden of the democratic process at 
the local level. The presence of a single candidate was present as a consequence of the 
simultaneous local election system. The decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) No.100 / 
PUUXIII / 2015 opened vast the opportunity for the local election to be held even though only 
one pair of regional head candidates participated consequence, an Empty Box was presented as 
the opponent of the match. 
Table 3. Single Candidates 
Period Area Win Lost 
2015 3 areas 3 areas - 
2017 9 areas 9 areas - 
2018 16 areas 15 areas 1 area 
2020 25 areas 25 areas - 
Source: processed by researcher 
After four periods of simultaneous local election implementation, a single candidate 
always has an increase in each implementation. The simultaneous local election, which was held 
for the first time in 2015, only presented three pairs of single candidates; in 2016, it increased 
three times to 9 pairs, in 2018 it became 16 pairs, and in 2020 was the highest number of 
previous local election, namely 25 pairs of single candidates. Moreover, all of them were won by 
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a single candidate. This number may increase every time the local election is held 
simultaneously. The reason is that almost all of the 3 local election were won by a single 
candidate, except for the 2018 Makassar. The chances of winning are more promising by 
advancing as a single candidate by buying political parties, so that prospective candidates have 
little chance of participating in local election contestation. 
Table 4. Single Candidates for the 2020 Local Elections 
No Candidates Status Area 
1 
Dosmar Banjarnahor - Oloan 
P. Nababan 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Humbang Hasundutan 
2 













5 Kuryana Azis - Johan Anuar Incumbent-Incumbent Ogan Komering Ulu 
6 
Popo Ali Martopo - Sholehien 
Abuasir 
Incumbent-Incumbent South Ogan Komering Ulu  
7 Mian - Arie Septia Adinata Incumbent-Incumbent North Bengkulu  
8 
Mohammad Said Hidayat -
Wahyu Irawan 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Boyolali 
9 
Sri Sumarni - Bambang 
Pujiyanto 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Grobogan 
10 
Arif Sugiyanto - Ristawati 
Purwaningsih 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Kebumen 
11 Hendrar PH - Hevearita GR Incumbent-Incumbent Semarang 
12 
Kusdinar Untung - Yuni 
Sukowati 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Sragen 
13 









15 Ony Anwar Harsono - Dwi RJ Incumbent-non Incumbent Ngawi 
16 
I Nyoman Giri Prasta - I Ketut 
Suiasa 
Incumbent-Incumbent Badung 
17 W Musyafirin - Fud Syaifuddin Incumbent-Incumbent West Sumbawa  
18 Rahmad Mas'ud - Thohari Aziz Incumbent-non Incumbent Balikpapan 
19 Edi Damansyah - Rendi Solihin Incumbent-non Incumbent Kutai Kartanegara 
20 




H. A. Kaswadi Razak - Luthfi 
Halide 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Soppeng 
22 
H. M. Aras T - H Muha Amin 
Jasa 
Incumbent-Incumbent Cental Mamuju  
23 
Markus Waran - Wempie 
Welly Rengkung 
Incumbent-Incumbent South Manokwari  
24 
Yosias Saroy - Marinus 
Mandacan 
Incumbent-Incumbent Pegunungan Arfak 
25 
Abdul Faris Umlati  - Orideko I 
Burdam 
Incumbent-non Incumbent Raja Ampat 
Source: processed by researcher 
The data above shows that of the 25 single candidates, only 4 are not incumbents. This 
means that the incumbent has a greater chance of advancing as the sole candidate. The 
incumbent has more considerable capital, economic, social, and political capital, so political 
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parties with a pragmatism attitude want to win early flock to nominate the incumbent. The 
capital owned blocks the potential presence of other candidates because they do not have 
access like that of the incumbent. A single non-incumbent candidate has different reasons, 
either because he did not receive a party recommendation like Wonosobo and Pematangsiantar. 
The incumbent had served for two terms, such as Pasaman and Kediri. 
Squire has investigated this phenomenon in the case of America, the combination of 
solid economic capital with high electability in the incumbent, presents a scare-off effect, which 
is a condition in which non-incumbent candidates behave not to participate in political 
contestation because they assume that they will experience defeat. A similar case was found in 
the Philippines by Sidel (2005) that other factors encourage the presence of a single candidate, 
namely the domination of local clans and the emergence of local bossism, which can make the 
candidate unchallenged, provide benefits, the domination of not access to local political sources 
and financial strength. 
The phenomenon of a single candidate presenting the single candidate as a match has 
damaged the substance of political contestation, which has eliminated healthy competition 
between candidates. The increase in a single candidate in each local election implementation is 
an anomaly because Indonesia adheres to a multi-party system. Supposedly, every party or 
coalition of political parties should bring their best cadres to advance in every election for 
political officials. According to Anggraini, so far, there are two types of single candidates: a 
single candidate for the incumbent and a single candidate for the family of the person in power 
(Jay, 2018). 
The problem is that the single candidate who generally is the incumbent does not 
always have a good performance. This phenomenon has given rise to suspicions of an evil 
agreement between a political party and a single candidate. The Director of Perludem stated 
that if the incumbent's performance was not good, the performance was not supportive, and the 
candidates who emerged were still single. There would be allegations of pragmatism and 
politics (Jay, 2018). A single candidate is legal based on the regulations on local election. 
However, this damages the substance of democracy. Political competition for the best leaders 
has stalled. Even a single candidate who is elected will be difficult to monitor because they 
support the majority of seat holders in the legislature. 
Candidate pairs participating in local elections are dominated by proposals from 
political parties or coalitions of political parties. Meanwhile, political parties' failure to carry out 
regeneration and the pragmatism of political parties in elections only seek victory for power. 
Potential cadres cannot compete with the power of figures who choose qualified electability 
(Rosanti, 2020). It is still a debate to date, is the presence of a single candidate because of the 
candidate who bought up all the parties in the legislature or the party that jointly nominated the 
same candidate? 
Political contestation must be competitive, but the presence of a single candidate almost 
nullifies the competition. Whereas elections with a contestation mechanism are crucial because 
they are based on three considerations, namely: (1) institutional arrangements to reach a 
political consensus where power is obtained through competitive struggles to get voter votes, 
(2) presenting responsive democracy, namely elected political officials, the election which is 
free and fair, inclusive voting rights, and the right to compete in order to win political office, and 
(3) provide support or legitimacy for decision-makers, namely the government elected through 
competitive contestation. 
Recruitment and Candidate Selection 
Political recruitment can be defined as the way prospective candidates are interested in 
competing for political office. In contrast, candidate selection is a process in which candidates 
are selected from among a pool of potential candidates (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). Political 
recruitment can be defined as how prospective candidates are interested in competing for 
political office. In contrast, candidate selection is a process in which candidates are selected 
from among a pool of potential candidates (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). These two processes 
are a form of selecting political parties to produce candidate leaders elected by the people. The 
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role of political parties in a democratic system has a significant impact on the country going 
forward. 
In most established democracies, there are no laws governing parties to elect their 
candidates, and each party is free to make its own rules. Some that have such laws include the 
United States, Germany, New Zealand, Norway (until 2002), and Finland. In the United States, 
each state determines in detail how parties elect their candidates (Rahat, 2007). 
Studies on political recruitment and candidate selection are mostly done by researchers, 
Rahat (2007). Rahat argues that generally, there are two systems used by political parties, 
namely inclusive and centralized/decentralized. The first is who the voters are (in other words, 
how inclusive is the “selectorate” that selects candidates from the party?). The second is where 
the elections occur (in other words, is it centrally controlled or not?). In the territorial sense, the 
second parameter relates to whether a candidate is elected at the national or regional level. 
Starting from Rahat's opinion, Indonesia's party system is still very exclusive because 
the candidate selection process is determined by a handful of party elites whose candidate 
candidates are determined at the center. Party leaders play a central role in candidate selection. 
Therefore, Norris has an analysis of the degree of centralization in the candidate process. In 
some of the countries that Norris has studied, parties do not want the delegation of authority to 
elect candidates to the regions because voters may not have a solid partisan identification, 
thereby significantly reducing the importance of party prerogatives (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 
2008). 
Inclusiveness involves the number of people involved in selecting a candidate, with 
important implications for candidate loyalty. While inclusiveness and centralization may 
overlap, candidates' choice can be decentralized but exclusive, with local figures selecting 
candidates; or it can be decentralized and inclusive if elections are initiated openly to be used to 
elect candidates (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). 
However, it cannot be denied that elitism in decision-making in political parties has 
become a massive general phenomenon; this is what Michels in Purwaningsih & Subekti (2017) 
calls a political oligarchy, that is, a handful of elites only controls organizations. This oligarchic 
process is proof that the party system is ineffective. This cannot be separated from the causal 
relationship between political parties and pragmatic people. Political parties are periodically 
present in the community ahead of elections to get legitimate power legitimacy so that the 
people are only used as vehicles to gain power. Likewise, the relationship between candidates 
and political parties formed on an ad hoc basis, is only personal, not political, and only occurs 
before the election. After that, the candidate is the focus of the campaign. The material barely 
refers to the party platform. Together with the funds raised from candidates and relatives, the 
personal and family networks of the candidates are crucial in determining the electoral 
contestation (Buehler & Tan, 2018). 
The process of recruitment and candidate selection at internal political parties that do 
not work well is why the democratic process in Indonesia is running in place upstream. The 
presence of a single political dynasty and a single candidate was also caused by the two 
processes' destructive results. As described above, the political dynasty candidate and the single 
candidate have a greater chance of winning than other candidates. This potential is used by 
parties and candidates to want to win the contest earlier. This gap provides an entry point for 
potential corruption to occur by buying up political parties. As the KPK finds that in the 2018 
local election, a number of candidates paid dowries to political parties ranging from 50-500 
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Table 5. The 2020 Local Election Political Dynasty Candidate Bearer Party 
No Party Total Area 
1 PDI-Perjuangan 28 
2 Golkar 23 
3 PAN 23 
4 Nasdem 14 
5 Demokrat  14 
6 PKB 11 
7 PBB 10 
8 Gerindra 8 
9 PPP 8 
10 Hanura 8 
11 PSI 2 
12 Berkarya 2 
13 Perindo 2 
PDI-Perjuangan, as the winning party for the 2019 Election, is the party that carries the 
most candidates affiliated with political officials. For example, the candidates for mayor of Solo 
and Medan are Joko Widodo's son and son-in-law, who displaced many potential cadres who 
first served the party. This, of course, cannot be separated from the authority of President Joko 
Widodo. The goal is to win electoral political contestation more easily and maintain a political 
balance between the centre and the regions. 
Table 6. The 2020 Local Election Single Candidate Candidate Bearer Party 
No Party Total Area 
1 PDI-Perjuangan 24 
2 Golkar 24 
3 PAN 17 
4 Nasdem 20 
5 Demokrat  18 
6 PKB 17 
7 PBB 2 
8 Gerindra 17 
9 PPP 14 
10 Hanura 13 
11 PSI 1 
12 Perindo 8 
13 PKPI 7 
According to (Norris & Lovenduski, 2017) the political recruitment mechanism in the 
case of single candidates and political dynasties is a form of compartmentalization type 
recruitment, namely a form of political recruitment based on pragmatic considerations, a 
mixture of meritocracy and partiality. Candidate selection in determining candidates is 
ostensibly meritocratic, but it is centralistic in the final determination by the party. Party elites 
prioritize capital ownership, electability, and several other indicators that can win the contest. 
This process of decay of democracy will continue if there are no internal improvements 
to political parties. If political parties carry out their functions properly, namely selecting 
candidates inclusively based on the merit system, they will have many references to determine 
their leaders. However, if this phenomenon is neglected, political dynasties and single 
candidates may be more fertile. These two phenomena are what destroy Indonesia's democratic 
order in the future. 
 
CONCLUSSION 
The phenomenon of political dynasties and single candidates comes because of political 
parties' pragmatic attitude who want to win electoral political contestation early. Political 
parties pay more attention to candidates from dynasties who have a kinship with political 
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officials and single candidates because they have a greater chance of winning the contestation. 
Political parties' political recruitment and candidate selection are the entry points for the 
fertility of these two phenomena in the local realm. Both political dynasties and single 
candidates in each local election implementation period have always experienced an increase. 
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